Client-side scanning (CSS) is sold as a technical fix: apps analyse content before encryption, flag suspected child abuse material and send automated reports to designated centres. In reality it creates an always-on inspection layer over all private communication.

EU legal services and multiple data protection authorities have already warned that a blanket CSS mandate could collide with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, especially the rights to privacy and the confidentiality of communications. It does not target suspects; it targets everyone, by default and indefinitely.

Once such an inspection layer exists, its scope is limited not by technology but by politics. A tool introduced “only for child protection” can be extended to other categories of content, behaviours or keywords with a simple legislative tweak.

• Continuous analysis of all messages and media on the device.
• Practical weakening of end-to-end encryption guarantees.
• Centralised reporting of algorithmic “hits” and metadata.
• Low friction to expand what is being scanned in the future.

Cryptographers, security researchers and digital-rights organisations converge on one conclusion: a mandatory CSS regime would normalise mass scanning of private communications in the name of safety. That is a line Europe has so far refused to cross.

If a strict client-side scanning mandate is ever adopted, its impact will go far beyond law enforcement. It will quietly reshape where Europeans talk, which tools they trust and where digital infrastructure lives.

Ordinary users are unlikely to move en masse to niche decentralised networks. They will do something simpler: shift their important conversations to platforms and jurisdictions the EU cannot effectively regulate. Some services will exit the market; others will degrade features for European users only.

The paradox is obvious: the harder Brussels squeezes encrypted communication inside the Union, the more of that communication will happen outside its reach.

Loss of technological sovereignty. When secure platforms relocate or operate from elsewhere, the EU’s own standards have less leverage. Instead of gaining oversight, Europe risks surrounding itself with an expanding belt of “informational fog” where critical communication happens offshore.

Reputation and trust. The EU built its global image on the claim that fundamental rights are non-negotiable. A law later criticised as unconstitutional would not just be a legal issue; it would erode public trust in the institutions meant to defend those rights.

Economic and innovation costs. Startups and established companies in secure communications, encryption and cloud services would face heavy compliance risk. Many will simply prioritise other regions. Fewer European alternatives mean deeper dependence on external tech giants whose interests do not necessarily align with European values.